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fN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
REPLY BRIEF

LINDA LOU COLEMAN,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Case No. 2000844-CA
Priority No. 15

-vsKENNETH DOUGLAS COLEMAN,
Respondent/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PETITIONER/APPELLANT (hereinafter "Petitioner" or "wife") submits the following as
her Reply to the Responsive Brief of the Appellee (hereinafter "Respondent" or "husband") in the
above matter:
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
Jurisdiction to review thefinaljudgment and order herein, which is the Amended Decree
of Divorce, is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals, Rules 3 and 4, and Utah Code Annotated. §78-2a-3(2)(h).
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
The matter below is a divorce proceeding, and the order appealed from is an Amended
Decree of Divorce.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A.

Does the lack of a trial transcript prevent the issues at bar from being considered

by the Court of Appeals?
4

B

Are the trial court's findings of fact sufficient to support the trial court's

conclusions regarding the amount and duration of alimony awarded to the Petitioner?
C

Can this Court determine from the record of trial the basis of the trial

court's alimony award?
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES
There is no case law nor statutory authority believed by the Petitioner to be wholly
dispositive of the issues raised on appeal However, Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5 is relevant to
this appeal
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P 2d 255 (Utah 1999), the Utah Supreme Court stated clearly
that, if the Court of Appeals determines that the findings of fact are insufficient to support the
legal conclusions of the trial court, the Court of Appeals should remand the matter for further
proceedings Id "In formulating alimony awards, the trial court has broad discretion, and its
decisions will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice " Watson v.
Watson, 837 P 2d 1, 3 (Utah App 1992), {citing Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P 2d 84, 90 (Utah
App 1989) The courts will not disturb a trial court's alimony award so long as the trial court
exercised its discretion within the appropriate legal standards, and "supported its decision with
adequate findings and conclusions

'" Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P 2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App

1988)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from thefinaljudgment and Amended Decree of Divorce entered in the
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, Provo Division, State of Utah, the
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Honorable Gary D. Stott, District Court Judge presiding, who, among other things, entered an
order regarding alimony and attorney's fees.
The Amended Decree of Divorce from which this appeal arises was entered on or about
August 30, 2000. A notice of appeal was timely filed on behalf of the Petitioner on or about
September 20, 2000. The Petitioner filed for divorce in the trial court. Responsive pleadings were
filed and the matter came before the lower court for trial on April 5, 2000. The court took the
matter under advisement and issued its Memorandum Decision on April 10, 2000. The Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, as well as the Amended Decree of Divorce, were based on the
Memorandum Decision and were entered on August 30, 2000. It is from the Amended Decree of
Divorce that the Petitioner has brought her appeal.
There are no motions pending in the trial court pursuant to Rule 50(a) or 50(b), 52(b),
54(b), or 59, of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Petitioner has already stated the facts in her initial appellate brief to this Court. For
the sake of brevity, those facts will not be restated here, but rather will be referred to in the
Petitioner's brief as necessary.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court abused its discretion in failing to state with specificity the basis

of its decision in making an award of alimony to the Petitioner in the above-entitled case. The
trial court mentions the factors necessary for determining alimony awards pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §30-3-5 (1988), however, the trial court failed to apply the requirements of that
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statutory regime to the facts of the case at bar The Respondent would have this Court believe
that an absence of a trial transcript necessarily means that the presumption should enter that the
findings of the trial court were supported by evidence in the record However, the Respondent
fails to focus on the adequacy of the findings, which is the central issue on appeal It may well be
that the evidence presented supports, or does not support, the determination of the trial judge in
this matter However, absent findings that clearly state a basis for an award of alimony, neither
the Petitioner nor this Court can determine what issues of clear error may have been committed
by the trial court In short, it is the very nature of the Petitioner's claim on appeal that the
Respondent would urge this Court to use as a basis for denying relief, that being a lack of clarity
and specificity on the part of the trial court in fashioning the award of alimony granted the
Petitioner
The Respondent next urges this Court to consider the fact that the Petitioner's own
counsel prepared the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which was the basis of the
Amended Decree of Divorce entered in this matter as being noteworthy Respondent implies that
the Petitioner's claim should be viewed negatively because of this fact This argument has no
merit The factual identity of the party ordered by the Court to prepare the final documents
reflecting the decision of the Court as stated in the Court's Memorandum Decision is a function
of practicality, not one of merit based fault The Petitioner's counsel had to prepare the pleadings
as a matter of course, not as a matter of determining the adequacy of the trial court's actions In
fact, had Petitioner's counsel tried to "clarify" or "clean up" the trial court's rulings, it would have
been grossly unethical Further, given the fact that the Petitioner's counsel had only the
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Memorandum Decision provided by Judge Gary D Stott to work with in fashioning the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it becomes clear why they so closely mirror the inadequate
language found in that Memorandum Decision Judge Stott gave no insight as to the basis of his
alimony award anywhere else but in that Memorandum Decision No information was given
during the trial that would even remotely suggest what evidence presented by the parties was
considered by the Court The Judge merely indicated at the close of evidence that he would
carefully consider all the evidence presented before him and would do his best to make a fair
decision in this matter, which would be delivered in written format to the parties' respective
counsel at a later time
ARGUMENT
POINT 1.

A

THE LACK OF TRIAL TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT
PREVENT THE COURT OF APPEALS FROM
MAKING A DETERMINATION AS TO THE
ADEQUACY OF FINDINGS AND NEED FOR
REMAND.

The Respondent relies primarily on Sampson v. Richins, 770 P 2d 998 (Utah Ct

App 1989) in making his argument that the Court of Appeals must find that the trial court's
findings and decision were supported by adequate evidence from the record (Brief of Appellee,
pages 5-6) However, in doing so the Respondent has shown a misunderstanding of the
Petitioner's position in this matter It is at the heart of the Petitioner's claim on appeal that the
trial court failed to state specifically and sufficiently what the trial court's basis was for entering
the ruling it made on the issue of alimony Thus, any argument in regards to factual disputes over
the findings is useless until such time as sufficient findings on all relevant issues can be examined
8

Only then will a transcript of the trial court hearing will be needed Until then, arguing over the
facts and evidence submitted at trial is pointless as we cannot determine yet what facts the trial
court found relevant
The Court in Sampson stated specifically that "Where the record before us is incomplete,
we are unable to review the evidence as a whole and must therefore presume that the verdict was
supported by admissible and competent evidence " Id. at 1002 citing Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P 2d
763, 765 (Utah 1985) AccordBevan v J.H. Constr. Co., 669 P 2d 442, 443 (Utah 1983)
However, Sampson went on further to state that "

the findings must themselves be sufficient

to provide a sound foundation for the judgment, and conversely '

any proper judgment can

only be entered in accordance with the findings ' Forbush v. Forbush, 578 P 2d 518, 519 (Utah
1978) Therefore, our review is strictly limited to whether the trial court's findings of fact support
its conclusions of law and judgment " Id
In ignoring the above-relevant portion of Sampson, the Respondent also failed to discuss
other relevant cases on point, such as Parks v. Zions First Natl Bank, 673 P 2d 590 (Utah 1983),
which held that Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the trial court's
" findings of fact must clearly indicate the 'mind of the court,' and must resolve all issues of
material fact necessary to justify the conclusions of law and judgment entered thereon
Furthermore, failure of a trial court to enter adequate findings requires the judgment to be
vacated " Id at 601 citing State ex rel. K.D.S.,, 578 P 2d 9, 11 (Utah 1978), Romrell v. Zions
First National Bank 611 P 2d 392, 394-95 ( Utah, 1980), Boyer Company v. Lignell, 567 P 2d
1112, 1113 (Utah, 1977), and Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P 2d 233, 236 (Utah, 1983)
9

It is clear from the discussion given in the initial brief of Appellant, and further discussion
to be reviewed infra, that the trial court's findings in this matter do not "clearly indicate the mind
of the court." Moreover, the reader has little ability to agree or disagree with the findings of the
trial court in this matter as the findings are stated more from a standpoint of being conclusory
statements as opposed to well articulated findings of fact. Of particular note in this regard would
be what, if any, basis the trial court had for concluding that the Petitioner would be sufficiently
able to provide for herself an adequate income equal to the standard of living enjoyed by the
parties during the term of the marriage after the year 2005. (Memorandum Decision \ 4.) The
trial court takes time to note the fact that length of marriage is one of the factors that should be
considered in making an award of alimony (Memorandum Decision % 4), but fails to describe how
the court factored that requirement into making its decision regarding the alimony award, as
stated above. The Parks decision discussed above states further as follows:
In addition to the rules set forth above regarding the sufficiency of the trial court's
findings of fact, this Court has observed:
The importance of complete, accurate and consistent findings of fact in
a case tried by a judge is essential to the resolution of dispute under the
proper rule of law. To that end the findings should be sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached."
Id citing Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979).
POINT 2.

THE WIFE CAN CHALLENGE THE TRIAL COURT'S
LACK OF FINDINGS, EVEN WHERE HER COUNSEL
PREPARED THE FINDINGS, SO LONG AS THE TRIAL
COURT FAILED TO GIVE ADEQUATE INFORMATION
WITH WHICH TO PREPARE THE FINDINGS .
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The Respondent takes Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) out of context in an
attempt to discredit the Petitioner in this case. In Jones, the trial court failed to give insight into
the values of some disputed property items, the value of which was later raised on appeal. There,
the wife had an opportunity to assign a value in the findings based upon the wife's own estimation
of the value, and yet failed to state what those values were in her findings which were prepared by
her counsel. Id at 1073.
Jones is easily distinguished from the case at bar in that the Petitioner here has no way of
divining from the conclusory statements made in the trial court's Memorandum Decision what
formula for calculation the trial court used in arriving at the stated alimony award. Assigning
value to one's marital property is within the purview of a party to estimate in making findings.
The thought processes by which a judge makes an award of alimony is not. This is especially true
considering that no insight was given by the court as to what weight the court gave the parties'
relative lists of expenses as stated in their exhibits, what the court considered the parties'
standards of living to be, or what the court considered the reasonable needs and ability to pay
might be of both parties to this action. All of these factors are to be considered and stated with
specificity for an award of alimony to be upheld. "We have held that the omission of particular
findings in alimony awards is an abuse of discretion." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Utah
App. 1990) {citingRuhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah App 1987). Further, "The
payor spouse's reasonable needs are a necessary step in determining the ability to provide
support." Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah App. 1995) (citing Willey v. Willey
866 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah App. 1993)). "The trial court is required to enter sufficient findings on
11

the three enumerated [Jones] factors, and we will reverse if it fails to do so unless the relevant
facts are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of judgement.'"
Breinholt, 905 P.2d at 880 (citing Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1213 (Utah App. 1991),
cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991)). As was shown earlier, the court in this matter stated
which factors the court was to consider, but then gave no insight as to how the court considered
these factors. No clearer example can be shown than the lack of insight given to the trial court's
consideration of the duration for which the trial court awarded the Petitioner alimony. The trial
court stated that alimony should terminate after 2005, (Memorandum Decision ^f 4 page 4), and
yet the trial court gives no basis for why alimony should terminate after the year 2005. Absent
adequate findings, the Petitioner can only assume that no basis exists and the determination was
arbitrary and capricious.
However, the Respondent would have the court hold that, because the Petitioner failed to
invent reasons on her own, this court should penalize her for asking for clarification and review of
the cryptic decision given to her by the trial court. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
in this matter are only as vague and lacking as the source from which they flowed. Were this
court to rule that the Petitioner is barred from seeking clarification and review of the decision of
the trial court merely because her counsel prepared the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
that represent the trial court's flawed decision, this would have a significant "chilling effect" on
the willingness of any party ever to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in any case
for fear that by doing so they may be waiving their right to appeal some or all of the issues
decided in that action.
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POINT 3.

THE COURT OF APPEALS CANNOT ASSUME WHAT
BASIS THE TRIAL COURT USED TO DETERMINE ITS
AWARD OF ALIMONY TO THE WIFE, ABSENT A CLEAR
INDICATION FROM THE TRIAL COURT.

The Respondent spends a great deal of time surmising on pages 8-12 of the Brief of
Appellee what the Respondent assumes might be the basis for the trial court's determination of
the award of alimony for the Petitioner in this matter. However, the Respondent's calculations are
the stuff of fantasy. The Respondent discusses on page 10 of his Brief what the Respondent
believes to be the reasonable basis for calculating expenses of the Petitioner and Respondent were
at the time of trial, making deductions for his various debts and child support and alimony
arrearage obligations, and arrives at figures that the Respondent hopes are in line with the
thinking of the trial court in making the award of alimony. However, this entire line of reasoning
is speculative because the trial court did not articulate this method of calculation anywhere in the
Memorandum Decision, which was, as stated earlier, the only articulated information that the trial
court gave on the issue of alimony. During the actual hearing in question, the Judge declined to
comment on the sufficiency of any piece of evidence relating to the issue of alimony during trial,
except to allow the evidence to be admitted into evidence. All comments regarding the evidence
submitted in this matter were reserved for the Memorandum Decision delivered by the Judge on
April 10, 2000.
The Respondent acknowledges that the trial court failed to explain why the court's award
of alimony terminates in 2005. (Brief of Appellee page 11). However, the Respondent contends
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that this is not a fatal flaw, as this Court can still affirm judgment of the trial court if all the
relevant facts support a finding in favor of judgment. Furthermore, Respondent's urges this Court
to assume the wife has admitted to the sufficiency of the findings of the trial court due to her
failure to provide a transcript. As discussed above, the reasoning of the Respondent in this regard
is flawed in that it requires this Court to ferret out from the exhibits of the trial court and the
supposition of the Respondent the reasoning supporting the trial court's decisions. In short, the
Respondent is asking this Court to fully support and explain and support the decision of the trial
court instead of enforcing the policy that it is properly the job of the trial court to do its' own
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Findings of Fact should "...clearly indicate the 'mind
of the court." Parks v. Zions First Natl Bank, 673 P. 2d 590 (Utah 1983), as discussed earlier.
The Respondent cites to Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah App. 1998), in stating
that no requirement exists for the court to make an award of alimony that lasts forever, or even
the length of the marriage (Brief of Appellee page 12). However, the Respondent failed to
address the critical distinction the Petitioner made in her initial brief between that case and the
case at bar. To briefly restate the distinction, the court in Childs found that limiting the award to
the recipient spouse to less than the length of the parties' marriage appropriate "...considering the
duration of the marriage [approximately 6 years], [recipient's] excellent health, youth, and ability
to improve her capacity to meet her own needs, and her fault in engaging in an extramarital
affair." Id. The case at bar reflects that the Petitioner was involved in a long term marriage of 26
years, is 52 years old, and was found to have no marketable jobs skills other than those necessary
to obtain a minimum wage job.
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Further, the Respondent's Brief chooses to omit from his discussion the mandatory
authority on the subject of alimony awards as they relate to the length of marriage found in
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), which held that alimony awards in marriages of
long duration should, to the extent possible, equalize the parties' standard of living as close as
possible to that enjoyed during the marriage. Id at 1081.
Finally, the Respondent admits in his own brief that the trial court did not articulate
specific findings in making its alimony award when the Respondent suggests that on remand,
u

[t]he trial court may be able to enter specific findings describing how it reached its decision."

(Brief of Appellee page 12).
POINT 4.

THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED
TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL

The Petitioner holds to her original argument for attorney's fees on appeal as stated in her
Brief of Appellant found on pages 24-26. '"Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce have been awarded
to the party who then prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on appeal.'"
Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 8 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494
(Utah App. 1991) (quoting Burt, 799 P.2d at 1171 (Utah App. 1990)). See alsoMunns v. Munns,
790 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah App. 1990) (citingRasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah
App. 1988).
Respondent argues that since all the Petitioner is looking for on appeal is a remand, she
should not be entitled to fees unless she prevails on remand. However, if the Petitioner seeks
remand from appeal, then a remand should be considered a prevailing circumstance. Thus her fees
should be awarded. Further, in the event that the remand is with instructions consistent with an
award that would allow the Petitioner to prevail, the court should grant fees now.
15

CONCLUSION
The decision in this case should be remanded for further hearing with specific instructions
in regard to findings and the determination of the Petitioner's alimony award. The allegations of
the Respondent that the Petitioner's arguments are fatally flawed by her failure to provide a
written transcript of the trial is incorrect, as the thrust of Petitioner's claims is that the findings are
not specifically articulated enough to give adequate insight or support for the trial court's
decision. The Respondent uses circular reasoning to describe why the Petitioner should be
penalized for not inventing her own factual support for an award of alimony that the Petitioner
does not believe is valid, merely because the Petitioner's counsel was instructed to prepare the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and ignores the fact that the Petitioner's counsel was
left inadequate resources to make proper findings because of the incomplete Memorandum
Decision of the trial court.
The Respondent's arguments as to the adequacy of the alimony award determination are
pure speculation. The Respondent's own brief acknowledges the lack of specificity in the trial
court's decision regarding the lack of guidance as to why the trial court arbitrarily limited the
payment of alimony by the Respondent to the year 2005, and arbitrarily reduced the amount after
December 2000.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon & Williams,
attorneys for the Petitioner/Appellant herein, and that I caused the foregoing REPLY BRIEF to
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Attorney for Respondent/Appellee
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